This is an application under Section 91 of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 (“the Act”). The applicants’ particular proposal is to remove a requirement in the Deed of Conditions applicable to flats of which they are owners or occupiers (in most cases, both) that the House Manager of a sheltered housing development in which the flats are situated has to reside in the building; and consequentially to remove various provisions in relation to the House Manager’s Apartment so that it would revert to the status of an ordinary flat in the development. The respondents are members of a family who jointly own one flat in which their mother or mother-in-law resides. Parties agreed under Rule 26 of the Lands Tribunal for Scotland Rules 2003 that the application could be disposed of without a hearing.
 The Tribunal has decided, for the reasons given below, that it is reasonable to grant the main part of the application, i.e. to vary the Deed of Conditions insofar as it requires the House Manager to reside in the building and makes special provision in relation to the House Manager’s Apartment, with consequential alteration in the allocation among the proprietors of maintenance, etc. charges. However, insofar as the application apparently seeks to remove altogether the requirement in the Deed of Conditions for unanimity in relation to decisions to vary certain conditions, we are not satisfied that that would be reasonable. In other words, the Tribunal’s decision overrides the requirement for unanimity in relation to the particular subject matter of this application – the requirement for the House Manager to be resident, and associated provisions – but does not change the requirement for unanimity (subject to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction) in relation to some other matters.
 These are contained in a Deed of Conditions by McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Limited, registered on 19 August 2005 (“the Deed of Conditions”), relating to Ericht Court, Upper Mill Street, Blairgowrie and specified in the Burdens Section of the estate title PTH22361 and in the titles of the individual flats. This provides inter alia:-
“4.5 Resident House Manager (Core Burden). There shall be at all times a full time House Manager for the Building. This is a Core Burden in terms of Section 54 of the 2003 Act. The House Manager shall be resident in the Building. This is a Core Burden in terms of Section 54 of the 2003 Act …
“5.13.6 The Proprietors shall not have any power to vary any part of this condition 5 except by unanimous decision of all Proprietors.”
 There are references throughout the Deed to the “House Manager’s Apartment” (which is Flat 6), an individual flat in effect retained in the ownership of the developers, bearing no responsibility for common charges, the charges relating to it being included in the charges payable by the 47 other individual flat owners. Common charges are allocated in the proportion of 2/109 for flats with one bedroom and 3/109 for flats with two bedrooms.
 The application bore to be signed by 41 flat owners (in one case, both; in another case, by an executor). The application bears to seek variation of the Deed of Conditions, with a summary referring to removal of all references to the manager’s flat, making it subject to the same title conditions as the other 47, changing the current 100% majority required for some decisions and re-allocating the distribution of fees to 2/112 and 3/112. There was some possible doubt as to whether all the applicants were proprietors (some flats being owned by non-residents), but the Tribunal’s normal check against ownership information from the Land Register matched 38 signatories against ownership. In one case (Flat 32), the holder of a Power of Attorney drew the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that the proprietor, her mother, who had signed the application, lacked legal capacity, the Attorney being in fact opposed to the application. The application was accordingly made by at least 37 proprietors.
 The respondents opposing the application are Barry Applin, John Francis Raeburn Grieve, Margaret Elizabeth Bell Grieve or Cunningham and Michael David Allan Grieve, as joint owners of Flat 7, which is occupied by their mother or mother-in-law Marjory Grieve. The Attorney mentioned above also initially opposed the application but subsequently withdrew opposition. McCarthy & Stone, as owners of Flat 6, did not join in the application and have not lodged any representations in the matter.
 Parties agreed to disposal of the application without an oral hearing and, in accordance with the Tribunal’s normal practice in that situation, lodged final written submissions in relation to the ‘pleadings’ previously lodged. The Tribunal considered whether to insist on a hearing in view of the issues involved in this case, but decided against that course. Having regard to the particular issues, the Tribunal decided not to hold any site inspection.
 On the basis of the parties’ pleadings and submissions, the following facts are undisputed.
 Ericht Court is a sheltered housing development built around 2006 and presently comprising 47 privately owned flats and a manager’s flat, Flat 6, owned by the developers, McCarthy & Stone. The development is managed by Peverel Scotland Limited.
 The Deed of Conditions includes standard community burdens relating to this flatted building and sheltered housing development, including provision in relation to a House Manager’s Office, the House Manager’s Flat and common parts such as a residents’ lounge, communal laundry, guest accommodation, etc.
 A number of provisions (in addition to Clause 4.5 narrated above) relate directly to the character of the development as a retirement housing development.
Clause 2.3.4 provides:-
“Restrictions on Use (Core Burden) The following is a Core Burden in terms of section 54 of the 2003 Act. Each Dwellinghouse (other than the House Manager’s Apartment) shall be used only as a private residence for the purpose of sheltered housing accommodation (specifically designed for the elderly) and for no other purpose whatsoever and shall not be sub-divided.
Clause 2.3.5. provides:-
“Age Restriction (Core Burden) The following is a Core Burden in terms of Section 54 of the 2003 Act. Occupancy of each dwellinghouse (other than the House Manager’s Apartment) shall be restricted to private individuals and, in the case of single occupancy, the Dwellinghouse shall be occupied by a private individual who is at least 60 years old. In the case of joint or multiple occupancy of any Dwellinghouse, at least one occupant shall have attained the age of sixty years, and there shall be no more than one occupant below the age of sixty years. There shall be no occupants below the age of fifty five years old. … Occupancy of a Dwellinghouse by any person who, at the time of taking up occupancy is not capable of leading an independent and active lifestyle, taking full advantage of the facilities offered at the Property, is prohibited.”
Clause 2.3.12 provides:-
“Leasing and Sale (Core Burden) The following is a Core Burden in terms of Section 54 of the 2003 Act. In the event of any Proprietor desiring to lease, sell or otherwise dispose of his Dwellinghouse (other than the House Manager’s Apartment) or to make any change in the use or occupancy thereof he shall be obliged to give prior notification to us or our assignees and to the Managing Agent of his intention to do so. … The letting, sale or other disposal, or the changing of the use or occupancy of a Dwellinghouse (other than the House Manager’s Apartment) is prohibited unless the Managing Agent or us or our assignees as appropriate is first satisfied that on such lease, sale, disposal or change the Dwellinghouse will be used and occupied in accordance with the provisions contained in 2.3.4., 2.3.5 and 2.3.6
Clause 4.6 provides:-
“Provision of House Manager The Managing Agent will use his best endeavours to provide and maintain the services of a resident House Manager for the purpose of being available to the occupiers of the Building during normal working hours to render such assistance in cases of emergency as may be reasonably expected of a person in such position, possessing no medical or other special qualification or skill and to supervise the provision of services in the Building and to perform such other duties as the Managing Agent may in his absolute discretion stipulate. The House Manager shall be appointed and his appointment may be renewed or terminated by the Managing Agent.”
Clause 5 makes detailed provisions for meetings of proprietors, including, at 5.13, in relation to majorities required for binding decisions. Clause 5.13.3 provides that the proprietors have no power to discharge any identified core burden.
Clause 9 provides:-
“LANDS TRIBUNAL No application may be made to the Lands Tribunal for Scotland under sections 90(1)(a)(i) and 91(1) of the 2003 Act in respect of the foregoing community burdens servitudes and other real burdens (including this condition 9) for a period of 5 years after the date of registration of this Deed in the Land Register.”
 Following the death of a resident house manager in 2009 there has been no permanent house manager, with ad hoc arrangements involving relief managers being the norm. More than one house manager has lived locally but been obliged to spend some nights in the manager’s flat. A ‘Careline’ alarm system is fitted in each individual flat and linked to a remote centre.
 Residents have discussed the possibility of discharge of the burden stipulating that the house manager should be resident since at least July 2011. A residents’ meeting then agreed on the formation of a Working Group of three residents to take matters forward. Further residents’ meetings have followed. No record was produced of any form of intimation of these meetings to non-resident proprietors or of any other formal consultation in the matter. Residents were told at a meeting on 7 September 2011 that contacting “absentee owners” was the responsibility of Peverel.
 The applicants claim that it has become increasingly difficult to find and retain a full-time resident live-in manager. They refer to arrangements following the death of the manager in 2009 as proving that the community could survive without a resident manager. They had a manager who would be happy to fulfil all her obligations without living in. Technological advances in relation to call services had helped to reduce the role of the manager. Owners were having to service unnecessary costs with depreciating and depleting savings and income. The reality was that this was not a care assisted development. There was no reasonable expectation of 24 hours presence on the premises. The direct connection to Careline could and did ensure the availability of help outwith hours. The respondents’ criticisms of the process followed, and allegations of undue pressure on residents, was rejected.
 The respondents referred to an ethos of on-site support for residents such as their mother/mother-in-law, whose health had deteriorated, as anticipated at the time of purchase. But for the condition providing for an on-site manager, variable only by unanimous decision, they would not have purchased the property. Residential onsite managers provided a source of security daily, 24 hours a day, to the proprietors, a relationship with proprietors which a non-resident manager could not provide. They referred to a particular occasion on which the emergency alarm had been set off and there was no resident manager present. Careline worked in conjunction with the house manager in responding to calls. A resident manager could have responded immediately. That had had an impact on confidence. The working group which developed this proposal was non-elected, produced inaccurate correspondence, made unsolicited visits and failed fully to advise about the matter. Nor had the respondents been consulted in any ballot or correspondence. The respondents called on the applicants to vouch the capacity of those who signed the application. It was suggested, under reference to some correspondence with Peverel, that a suggestion that Peverel, and indeed the developers McCarthy & Stone, endorsed the proposal, was inaccurate. Financial calculations put forward to residents were flawed. A statement of the managers’ duties, having been prepared in May 2012, should be ignored. Costs associated with any change in, e.g., employment laws, required to be met. Weight should be given to the protection of a ‘core burden’. It was not relevant that the respondents were not resident. They were not looking for more assistance or care for their relative.
 In their final submissions, reviewing the factors listed in section 100 of the Act, the respondents submitted that if there had been any change in circumstances it may be that local authority and other support had diminished or become more expensive, making the benefits of a shared resident manager more important than in 2005. The respondents had relied, in their decision as to where it would be most appropriate for their relative to live, on the benefit of a resident manager and the status of that burden. The presence of a resident house manager set the development apart from others which offered no such support. It enhanced the amenity of the building and its value. The unanimity provision provided any purchaser or owner with peace of mind. There was no impediment to the enjoyment of the burdened properties. There was no practical difficulty in complying with the condition and the applicants had not provided any detailed information on the cost. Clear information on any cost saving had not been provided. Factor (e) was of little significance since the title conditions had been created fairly recently. It was clear that the purpose of Condition 4.5 was to enhance the amenity of the development for use by elderly people, providing additional support. The purpose of the Conditions 5.13 were to provide assurance that the protection of the core burdens could not be removed without unanimous consent. Reference was made to certain research findings in a Scottish Government publication. These referred to the importance of the house manager, and also to concerns about voting procedures in decisions, e.g. to reduce to part-time, or to go non-residential, by proprietors. In the absence of a proposal to pay compensation to the respondents, the Tribunal should be less inclined to allow the variations sought. These submissions also, for the first time, sought an award of compensation on the basis of the detrimental effect on the value, amenity and enjoyment of the respondents’ property, but without any quantification or evidence of effect on value. Finally, under Factor (j), the respondents referred to their submissions about the shortcomings of the decision-making process.
 This application appears to require consideration in two parts. It is principally an attempt to remove the requirement that the house manager is to live in the building, with all that follows on from that, i.e. reversion of the manager’s flat to the status of an individual property which would become an individual retirement flat subject to the same provisions as all the other flats. The application, however, additionally seeks to remove the requirement for unanimity of any decision to vary any part of the provision about required majorities. This may have been thought necessary in connection with the main issue but in fact goes beyond it. At all events, we shall deal relatively briefly with that second matter and concentrate our consideration on the question of the requirement for the manager to live in. That part involves many references throughout the Deed of Conditions but it is really a single issue. We note that, although the application is described as an application to vary, it involves at least partial discharge, rather than variation, of the central condition in issue, condition 4.5.
 It seems appropriate first to consider, and place in the context of this application under our jurisdiction, questions about the extent of support for, and opposition to, the application, together with the relevance of the provisions in the deed about unanimity and reference to ‘Core’ burdens.
 An application under Section 91 relates to burdens on proprietorship. Care therefore has to be taken in a case such as this in which some (apparently a smallish minority) of the flats are not in fact owned by the residents. The materials in relation to meetings, etc., appear to focus on residents rather than owners. However, as indicated above, the Tribunal’s initial checking of an application such as this includes checking against ownership as recorded in the Land Register. That process may not be completely foolproof in a case such as this, as the Register has not necessarily caught up with all changes in ownership. However, 38 signatories of the application did match up with ownership. The Tribunal is entirely satisfied that this application has been made by at least one quarter of the 48 units in the community and is therefore competent.
 The Deed of Conditions has clearly been drawn up with the provisions of the 2003 Act, which is expressly referred to in several places, in mind. The deed addresses the question of the proprietors themselves attempting to vary, or even discharge, burdens or other conditions in the deed. The Act includes a number of provisions about that – provisions which to a degree include recognition that deeds of conditions may specifically empower proprietors to discharge or vary conditions. As this deed of conditions recognises, Section 54 of the Act adds to those general provisions about proprietors varying or discharging some particular provisions, and some particular restrictions, in relation to any “sheltered or retirement housing development”. The concept of ‘core burdens’ is employed in these provisions. Ericht Court is a development subject to these provisions.
 By contrast, Section 91 of the Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal, rather than proprietors, and the particular provisions about ‘core burdens’ at sheltered housing developments are not directly relevant. Proprietors’ powers themselves to vary or discharge are curtailed or even removed, but the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is not subject to such restrictions. (Clause 9 of the deed in fact shows recognition of the possibility of application to the Tribunal.)
 We do, however, recognise as a relevant factor the question of the extent of support for (and opposition to) the application. That, set alongside the fact that the quite recent Deed of Conditions in effect requires unanimity for owners to remove the provision, is in our view plainly relevant to the issue about reasonableness. The fact that only 25% of owners are required for a competent application does not mean that in a general issue of this kind arguments about the extent of support and oppositionare not relevant for consideration. Provisions about required majorities in the deed accepted in their titles by all owners may also be taken into account. There may be cases in which a not unreasonable proposal has failed, after full and proper consideration by the body of proprietors, to secure the majority required under the titles, and the application may be considered unreasonable. On the other hand, a requirement of unanimity sets a very high bar and there may be cases in which there is only one or very few objectors and, on a consideration of all the factors as to reasonableness, the application may be considered reasonable.
 In this case, at least 37 (and possibly one or two more) owners, out of 47 (it seems reasonable in this context to omit the developers, who appear to have taken a very proper neutral stance) have positively supported and joined in the application. One owner, the present respondents, opposes. Another, through her Attorney, did oppose and seems likely still to disagree. That leaves a number who can be said not to have opposed but, not having joined in the application, have not positively supported it.
 We have also, however, considered the respondents’ allegation that, in the same way as (they allege) their mother was put under pressure (which she is said to have resisted) to agree, and a proprietor who is said to lack legal capacity actually signed the application (although, it is said, her daughter as her Attorney had opposed the proposal), some other applicants may have felt themselves under pressure to sign. The respondents claim to have correspondence from others supporting that allegation, although they have (understandably) not produced it. Against that, there is recorded anger at the very suggestion that, perhaps, many residents in some way lack capacity to act according to their own inclinations; and the Tribunal received letters testifying to the (it is said) very careful way in which those promoting this proposal canvassed views and obtained signatures. The Tribunal appreciates, as is referred to in some research to which we were referred, the possibility of at least a perception of pressure in such situations involving a number of elderly people. We have considered whether it is necessary to initiate some further enquiry into this aspect. In the present case, however, all the applicants have personally signed. Bearing in mind that this is not a care home, and considering all the material available to us, we consider that a requirement to vouch the mental capacity of each applicant would be going too far. It is possible that one or two might have perceived some form of pressure (we are in no position to judge whether there was actual pressure), but we think it highly unlikely that the main body of resident owners, who appear at least mostly to be active and leading independent lives, has been or felt under any pressure. So while the absence of special enquiry makes it impossible to be absolutely sure about every applicant, we think we should proceed on the basis that the application is indeed positively supported by some three-quarters of owners, with two opposing and the rest not opposing; and we place that alongside the provisions of the deed among the factors to be weighed up in considering whether this application is reasonable.
 Section 98(a) of the Act, as it applies to this application, provides:-
“An application for the variation or discharge … of a title condition shall … be granted by the Lands Tribunal only if they are satisfied, having regard to the factors set out in section 100 of this Act, that –
(a) … It is reasonable to grant this application.”
Section 98(b) does not apply to applications under Section 91.
 It is often useful, in considering the factors listed in Section 100, to consider first the purpose of the title condition (factor (f)). In this case, as we see it, there is no need to speculate about that: it is specifically set out in condition 4.6 narrated above. The purpose of provision of a resident manager is to assist residents in emergencies during normal working hours, in addition to other duties, which presumably relate more to the property than to the residents, laid down by the managing agents. The assistance is such as may reasonably be expected of a house manager without medical or other particular qualifications. That provision seems to us to give a very clear indication of the limitation of the role of a resident house manager.
 The extent to which the condition confers benefit to the benefited proprietors (i.e. all the individual flat owners and by extension the occupiers, including the respondents’ mother/mother-in-law), (factor (b)), does not appear to be any different from the benefit conferred by the requirement (which the application does not seek to remove) for a full-time manager. A non-resident manager would be in just the same position to provide assistance to residents during normal working hours. We are not sure about the position during the manager’s holidays, but this application makes no difference in relation to that.
 We do appreciate that having a resident manager adds a feeling of security, and it might be asked why, if this particular condition adds nothing, it was included and specifically identified as a ‘core burden’. We can readily believe that this was a marketed feature relied on by purchasers such as the respondents. No doubt there may be differing views about a call service, but the reality is that although a manager resident in Flat 6 may be expected to act as a good neighbour in any out of hours emergency, such a manager is clearly under no duty or obligation to assist in any particular way, or even to be present, out of hours. The deed does not give rise to any such expectation. The emergency incident referred to by the respondents could have happened with a resident manager. That of course reflects modern employment regulation. This is not a care establishment. Without a resident house manager, individual flat occupiers would still have neighbours, many of whom may also be able to provide reasonable neighbourly assistance. It will also be a benefit to residents to be able to get to know the manager, but, again, a full-time non-resident manager is really in no different position in relation to that. Although we do not think that the respondents have misunderstood the benefits of this condition to the extent suggested by the applicants, the fact is that its benefit is, on a proper analysis, very limited.
 In short, while we can accept that Condition 4.5 as a whole provides the substantial benefit of a full-time manager, the particular requirement from that manager to be resident does not, despite what might understandably be thought, contribute significantly to that benefit.
 On the material, we do not think it can be affirmed that there has been any relevant change in circumstances since the title condition was created (factor (a)). There is reference to experience with ad hoc managers since a resident manager died in 2009; to Careline; to the recession; and to employment regulation under the “European Time Directive”. It is not clear whether the out-of-hours call service was available from the outset. There is no indication of efforts made under condition 4.6 to recruit another resident manager. The terms of that condition seem to show an awareness at the time of the regulations about working time.
 The applicants describe the particular requirement for a resident manager as “an increasingly onerous burden” (factor (c)) and claim that it is unreasonable to have to bear the cost of that when circumstances have proved that they can exist safely as a community with the 24-hour access to help through Careline. This factor merges into factor (d), as to how practicable, or costly, the condition is. Although the material refers to cost comparisons produced during the residents’ consideration of the issue, and on the other side to criticism of the figures produced, no such costings have been provided to us. Without more information about the employment terms of non-resident and resident managers, we should assume that the employment costs might be broadly neutral but that there would be some savings in the property costs of Flat 6, which would be borne by its proprietor rather than by the body of proprietors, and also reduction from 2 or 3 109th shares to 2 or 3 112th shares. So there is an identifiable financial burden although this is shared among, currently, 47 proprietors. Again, the information provided about practicability of employing resident managers has not been vouched and does not really advance the applicants’ case. We agree with the respondents that we should not make a decision based on practicability or costs.
 These title conditions were created less than 8 years ago, not long after the 5 year embargo in Condition 9 on applications to the Tribunal. This relatively short period counts against the reasonableness of the application, particularly when the position about changes of circumstances is inconclusive.
 On a technical view, the conditions prevent a use for which, it can be assumed, there is planning consent, viz. use of Flat 6 as a retirement flat, but we consider that to be really incidental and not a factor of any weight (factor (g)).
 The respondents do not accept an assertion that the removal of this burden will not decrease the value of flats such as theirs. There is no actual evidence about that and we can envisage arguments both ways. At all events, we do not think this is a case in which compensation is of any particular relevance (factor (h).
 Factor (i) is of no application in this case.
 In relation to factor (j), we have already considered the extent of support, and opposition, alongside the requirement in the Deed of Conditions for unanimity. We should also consider the respondents’ criticisms of the meetings and consultation process. Taking discussion and consultation forward in property communities is not easy, and the number of proprietors here of course adds to that. The picture we have on the materials is of a careful process involving a number of residents’ meetings. We have already drawn attention to the lack of any indication as to how non-resident owners were involved. There is, however, a distinction between the procedural requirements for a decision by owners and applications to the Tribunal. The former, as we have said earlier, involve various statutory restrictions and requirements. These include, for example, the issuing of ‘Community Consultation Notices’, referred to by the respondents, as well as good practice requirements. We would not in any way seek to minimise the requirements of good practice, but when it comes to application to the Tribunal the question really relates to the reasonableness of the proposal. There is no requirement, as far as application to the Tribunal is concerned, for any ‘working group’ or group of proprietors considering and preparing an application to the Tribunal to be properly constituted in relation to proprietors’ meetings under the Deed of Conditions, or to have held full consultation. The question is whether the process followed makes any real difference in considering whether the application is reasonable. We do not found on assertions, either way, made during or about the prior process. It might be slightly more significant at a development, say, where the properties were all let out and matters have only really been discussed with residents none of whom are owners. The pre-application process can sometimes have some relevance in the matter of expenses, if it appears that the expense of the application procedure might have been avoided, but we do not think that it has any real bearing otherwise on the reasonableness of the application. We do not think that any criticism of the way in which this proposal was taken forward counts against its reasonableness. If anything, the previous discussions and holding of ballots among residents underlines the strength of support for the application.
 Drawing all these considerations together, we think the strongest factors are the absence of any purpose of providing any service to residents outside normal working hours, together with the absence of any real benefit, in practice, from this condition. The conditions produce some cost to the proprietors, but on the information available, and the cost being shared among 47, this does not seem to us a significant factor. A large majority positively wishes this change and others have not opposed it, but two proprietors, who understandably point to the provisions in the Deed of Conditions, are opposed. The conditions were accepted by the owners in very recent years. It is not really evident that any change of circumstances, other than the death of a resident manager, supports the reasonableness of the application. We have the picture that, with a few years’ experience of Careline and no resident manager, the vast majority of proprietors no longer consider a resident manager necessary.
 Particularly having regard to the lack of any real tangible benefit from having a resident full-time manager, as opposed to a non-resident full-time manager, in line with the stated purpose of the requirement to engage a resident manager, we have reached the view that this application supported by a large majority of residents is reasonable and should be allowed.
 As we indicated earlier, the application has another aspect. In effect, the applicants want to unlock the unanimity provision for changes in the requirements for decisions of proprietors. In other words, notwithstanding the provisions agreed in 2005 in relation to the competency of decisions, including variations or discharge of conditions in the Deed of Conditions, proprietors could be free to make such changes without having to take an application such as this to the Tribunal. We are not satisfied that this is reasonable. We agree with the respondents that these provisions have an identifiable purpose. This aspect of the application could have quite major consequences in relation to the powers of meetings of proprietors, in comparison with the restriction presently in place by virtue of Condition 5.13.6. The requirement of unanimity, subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, does not seem unreasonable.
 Accordingly, we shall allow the application to the extent indicated. Although the application did not specify in complete detail all the deletions, alterations and additions required, its meaning is clear and the Tribunal’s Clerk will shortly circulate a draft of the Order to be pronounced, allowing an opportunity for comment, on the basis of the Tribunal’s decision, on any specific detail. In the event of any issue arising about the expenses of this application, that also can be dealt with on the basis of written submission in accordance with the Tribunal’s normal practice.
Certified a true copy of the statement of reasons for the decision of the Lands Tribunal for Scotland intimated to parties on 16 May 2013
Neil M Tainsh – Clerk to the Tribunal